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Emission permit trading is a centerpiece of the Kyoto Protocol which allows participating 
nations to trade and bank greenhouse gas permits under the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. When market conditions evolve stochastically, emission trading produces a dynamic 
problem, in which anticipation about the future economic environment affects current banking 
decisions. In this paper, I explore the effect of increased uncertainty over future output prices and 
input costs on the temporal distribution of emissions. In a dynamic programming setting, a 
permit price is a convex function of stochastic prices of electricity and fuel. Increased 
uncertainty about future market conditions increases the expected permit price and causes a risk-
neutral firm to reduce ex ante emissions so as to smooth out marginal abatement costs over time. 
The convexity results from the asymmetric impact of changes in counterfactual emissions on the 
change of marginal abatement costs. Empirical analysis corroborates the theoretical prediction. I 
find that 1% increase in electricity price volatility measured by annualized standard deviation of 
percentage price change is associated with an average decrease in annual emission rate by 0.88%. 
Numerical simulation suggests that high uncertainty could induce substantially early abatements, 
as well as large compliance costs, therefore imposing a tradeoff between environmental benefits 
and economic efficiency. Policy implications for designing an effective and efficient global 
carbon market are discussed.  
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Cap-and-trade emission permit systems that allow permits to be traded over time (hereafter 
bankable emission permits trading or intertemporal emission trading) are witnessing growing 
regulatory interest as a cost-effective way to reduce total emissions. The grandest use for 
marketable permit trading is contained in Kyoto Protocol which allows participating nations to 
trade and bank greenhouse gas permits under the Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 1996). 
2 The U.S. sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions 
trading program established under Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments is one of the 
first, and by far the most extensive application of bankable emission permit trading. Under Title 
IV, firms are not only allowed to transfer allowances for emission of SO2 among facilities, but 
also allowed to bank them for use in future years.   
 
Despite the large interest in intertemporal emission trading, important theoretical and policy 
issues under this trading mechanism remain unexplored. In particular, although the theoretical 
literature on tradable emission permits has established an in-depth discussion regarding the 
efficiency and properties of their use since the early 1970s (Montgomery, 1972; Hahn, 1984; and 
see Titenberg [1985] and Cropper and Oates [1992] for thorough reviews), most of the literature 
considers trading between units, implicitly within a single time period. Theoretical analyses of 
intertemporal emission trading have only recently received attention (Rubin, 1996; Cronnshow 
and Kruse, 1996; Kling and Rubin, 1997; Schennach, 2000; Yates and Cronshaw, 2001; Leiby 
and Rubin, 2001; Stevens and Rose, 2002; Sedio and Marland, 2003; Maeda, 2004; Stranlund, et 
al., 2005; van Steenbergh, 2005; Feng and Zhao, 2006; Wirl, F. 2006). With few exceptions,
3  
these studies assume firms have perfect foresight. There has been no formal analysis of the 
impact of output  market uncertainty in the intertemporal permit literature. 
 
No environmental policy is implemented in the ideal world of certainty. In fact, uncertainty 
is a prevailing feature of many environmental policies, especially the global climate change 
program. For example, countries subject to Kyoto Protocol have to deal with various 
uncertainties over time, including the demand for energy, the speed and arrival of technology 
development, the engagement of other countries in the market, the total emission cap, and the 
interest rate etc. Revenue uncertainty, acting together with technological and policy uncertainty, 
will have important implications for countries’ intertemporal carbon management, including 
those decisions on investment in low-carbon and renewable technologies.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of uncertainty on the temporal pattern of 
emission trading. In particular, we ask how a mean-preserving increase in output price volatility 
would affect firms’ banking and abatement decisions. I develop a stochastic dynamic 
optimization model of a risk-neutral price-taking firm, which uses high- and/or low-carbon fuel 
                                                 
2 In particular, Kyoto Protocol sets legally binding emissions targets and timetables for Annex B countries. Together, 
Annex B countries must reduce their emissions of six greenhouse gases by at least 5% below 1990 levels over the 
commitment period 2008 – 2012. One Annex B country is allowed to purchase the rights to emit greenhouse gases 
from other Annex B countries. The protocol also allows for banking of permits, or mitigation in excess of 
commitments in some periods, with the prospect of mitigation at levels lower than commitments at some future date. 
Borrowing, however, is not explicitly mentioned.  
3 Studies that mention uncertainties include Schennach (2000), Feng and Zhao (2006).   3
to produce electricity. Current prices are known, but the future prices evolve stochastically. I 
show that in equilibrium, the marginal abatement costs of all firms are equalized with the permit 
price in each period; for each firm, the expected present marginal abatement costs are also 
equalized across time periods. When future compliance costs are expected to increase, firms will 
demand positive permits, bidding up the permit price (and therefore marginal abatement cost) 
until current and expected future prices are equal. 
 
The permit price is subject to output price shocks, which alter firms’ abatement costs by 
changing the industry-wide counterfactual emission level.
4  I prove analytically that the permit 
price, as well as firms’ marginal abatement cost, is a convex function of the electricity price. By 
Jensen’s inequality, this leads to a positive relationship between the marginal abatement cost and 
the increase in volatility of the stochastic variable. This convexity relationship results from the 
asymmetric impact of electricity price change on the change in marginal abatement cost. Because 
marginal abatement cost is convex (as long as the marginal productivity is decreasing), when the 
electricity price increases (and therefore the abatement level increases), the marginal abatement 
cost increases faster than it decreases when the electricity price falls. When uncertainty is 
pronounced, very high and very low electricity prices become more likely, and this asymmetric 
impact becomes more salient. In the presence of extreme electricity prices, firms would have a 
much higher incentive to reduce ex ante emission and accumulate permits so as to smooth out the 
marginal abatement costs over time. This conclusion holds whether the output market is perfectly 
competitive or not. In addition, the model is extended to allow uncertainties to enter through 
input costs and industry wide productivity. The conclusion follows the same line. 
 
In the second part of the paper, I empirically test the theoretical prediction using data 
observed from the U.S. SO2 allowance trading market from 1996 to 2004. Empirical analysis 
shows that one percent increase in electricity price volatility measured by annualized standard 
deviation of percentage price change is on average associated with a 0.88% decrease in annual 
emission rate. Overall, increased price volatility induced by electricity market restructuring over 
the last decade may explain 8-11% of the total amount of the banked allowances during Phase I 
of the U.S. SO2 trading program.   
 
To estimate the impact of market uncertainty on social welfare, I simulate the banking 
pattern, emission stream and the time path of permit price resulting from various degrees of 
output price uncertainties. Numerical results are quite suggestive and consistent with the 
empirical evidence. The results indicate that high uncertainty may generate substantially large 
compliance costs in the early years, deterring new entrants and cause efficiency loss; from the 
environment perspective, uncertainty encourages overcopmliance in early years; when a 
pollutant such as a greenhouse gas, creates stock damage, benefits from early abatement could be 
substantial.
5   
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II provides a literature review. 
Section III develops a firm model of intertemporal emission trading and derives the relationship 
                                                 
4 Counterfactual emission is the level of emission that would prevail when there is no environmental regulation.  
5 Currently, the transfer of unused allowances from the period 2005 - 2007 to the first commitment period under the 
Kyoto Protocol, i.e. 2008-2012, is not allowed under an EU-wide ban on banking (except for Poland and France), 
which from an  environmental point of view, seems to be a troubling decision.   4
between ex ante emissions and uncertainty; Section IV presents the empirical model and the 
estimation results. Section V discusses numerical simulation, welfare analysis and policy 
implications and Section VI concludes the paper. 
 
II. Background and Literature Review 
 
This paper is related to two strands of literature, that on intertemporal emission permit 
trading and that on capital investment under uncertainty. Previous theoretical investigations of 
intertemporal permit trading generally do not consider the presence of uncertainty. Rubin (1996) 
shows that when firms are allowed to freely bank and borrow permits across time, permit prices 
and pollutant emissions must evolve following  the deterministic path described by Hotelling’s 
rule. Within a similar framework, Kling and Rubin (1997) compare the emission path firms 
would choose with the social optimal solution and show that when borrowing and banking are 
allowed private solutions diverge from social optimum. Cronnshow and Kruse (1996) show that 
in a competitive tradable and bankable permit market, a competitive equilibrium exists and 
achieves aggregate emission targets for the least system cost.  
 
Schennach’s (2000) research is a first effort to study the implications of output market 
uncertainty on individual firms’ emission trading strategy. Among other conclusions, Schennach 
(2000) suggests that the higher the expected electricity price, the lower the emissions in earlier 
periods. Schennach (2000) also emphasized the role of the non-negativity constraint, a special 
feature associated with the U.S. Acid Rain Program, arguing that the expectation on a potential 
stockout of the banked permits may induce reduction of emissions in earlier periods. Feng and 
Zhao (2005) explore efficiency of the permit system when there is information asymmetry 
between regulatory agency and the regulated firm regarding uncertainty and find that the higher 
the degree of asymmetry, the more potential benefits form a bankable permit regime. While these 
papers constitute important steps toward an understanding of the potential consequences of 
uncertainty, they do not answer the question of how increased output market price volatility 
would modify the path of emissions. After all, it is the significant variation, not the level of 
prices that defines a volatile market. 
 
In spirit, this paper is closer to Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983, 1985).  In these models, the 
presence of adjustment costs, together with a constant-returns-to-scale technology, make the 
marginal revenue product of capital a convex function of output price. Therefore, increased 
uncertainty about the future price of output increases the expected marginal revenue product for 
a competitive firm and hence increases the intensity of investment.  Similarly, in this paper, I 
demonstrate the positive relationship between electricity price uncertainty and the expected 
marginal value of an permit by applying Jensen’s inequality for a convex function. However, the 
analysis of the marginal value of a permit has no direct analogue to the problems in the capital 
investment literature. In addition, I present the analysis in a more general framework, without 
assumptions of constant-returns-to-scale and perfect competition in the output market.  
 
Neither the theory nor the empirical assessment of the implications of the increased output 
market uncertainty for emission trading has been fully examined in the intertemporal trading 
literature. Therefore, this paper makes two specific contributions. First, I introduce uncertainty 
into the intertemporal trading model, which is theoretically more interesting and empirically   5
more relevant. In this model, firms’ decisions regarding permit trading is an ex ante choice in the 
sense that optimal emissions and permit banking decisions depend not only on current but also 
on expectation of future output and input prices. Second, I empirically test the theoretical 
prediction in a real trading program. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first attempt to 
quantitatively estimate the effects of uncertainty on emission trading based on actual market data.  
Although empirical analysis is conducted in the context of the U.S. SO2 allowance trading 
program, the conclusion is general enough to be extended to the analysis of global carbon trading 
program. 
 
III. Modeling Framework 
 
This section contains the basic theory of intertemporal permit trading under uncertainty. I 
begin by setting up a firm’s dynamic optimization problem, and then state and prove Proposition 
1 and Lemma 1 on the relationship between uncertainty, and banking/emissions. I then go on to 
show how conclusions can be affected by imperfect competition in the permit and output markets 
and returns to scale of production technology.  
III.(i) A Firm Model of Intertemporal Permit Trading Under Uncertainty 
Consider a risk neutral firm that uses adjustable levels of low- and high-carbon fuel to 
produce electricity. In each time period, the firm decides the electricity output (gt) chooses the 
mix of low- and high-carbon fuel (lt  and ht), and the amount of permits to buy (xt > 0) or sell (xt < 
0) to maximize its discounted present profits for a constrained level of emissions. Uncertainty 
exists in the supply and demand for electricity. Suppose this uncertainty is characterized by 
electricity prices Pe, which is a random variable that follows a Markov process. The probability 
law of Pe is known to all firms. At the start of each period t, the firm observes electricity price 
(Pet), permit price (Pat), the price for low- and high-carbon fuel (Plt and P ht), and the initial 
endowment of permits which is the sum of permits issued by the government at current period 
(At) and the amount of banked permits carried from the previous period (Bt). Refer to Table I for 
a thorough description of all model parameters used in the section. 
 
Firms are facing a dynamic optimization problem because choosing how many permits to 
save for the future has to be made before uncertainties over future prices are resolved. Assuming 
that firms are price takers in all markets, I model individual firm behavior as an intra-firm game. 
Taking the strategies of other firms as given, each firm picks a strategy in each time period that 
is optimal from the firm’s perspective in that period. The firm’s strategy is thus a map from the 
Markov state  { , , } tt t t PAB Λ=  to choose variables {lt, ht, xt}, where Pt   is a price vector, i.e. Pt = 
{Pet, Pat, Plt, Pht}. 
 
I assume firms employ three compliance strategies: abating emissions through blending or 
switching to low-carbon fuel, purchasing allowances in addition to initial allocation, and 
adjusting output levels. Other capital intensive strategies such as scrubbing, re-powering or 
permanently retiring a facility are not considered because regulatory, financial and other 
uncertainties in today’s volatile energy markets provide firms incentive to avoid capital intensive 
investment as long as possible.   
   6
Let Vi(Pt, Bt, At) denote firm i’s value at time t. The firm’s maximization problem can be 
written as: 
 
(1 ) 1 (1 ) (1 )
,,
( , , ) { ( , ) ( , ) [ ( , , )]} max
it it it
i t t t et it it it it it it at it t i t t i t i t
lhx
VPBA P glh clh P x EV P B A β ++ + + ≡− − + (1) 
s.t.     (1 ) (, ) i t it it it it it it B ABe l h x + =+− +                 (2) 
              (1 ) 0 it B + ≥                                          (3) 
 
where β is the discount ratio. In a discrete-time setting, β = 1/(1 + r) and r is the risk-free 
interest rate.
6
 E[·] is the expectations operator.  Eq.(2) is the state equation and defines the stock 
of banked permits in period t. Eq.(3) corresponds to the non-negativity constraint,i.e. borrowing 
against future emission reductions is not allowed. For simplicity, hereafter I suppress unit index i.  
  
The production function with low- and high-carbon fuels as two distinct inputs is 
represented by g (l,  h), which is assumed to be concave, increasing in both arguments, 
homogenous of degree 1, and twice differentiable everywhere.
 7 Most of the previous studies 
assumed output as given (Rubin [1996], Arimura [2002]). In competitive electricity markets, an 
assumption of fixed output seems untenable. In this model, I assume that producers may alter the 
output level as a way to meet the required emission standard.  
 
c(l, h) is the cost function. When a firm undertakes production, it incurs costs that can be 
described in terms of three components: (1) fuel costs, (2) adjustment costs associated with fuel-
blending or fuel-switching, and (3) other fixed costs including capital costs for mixing fuel. Once 
the binary choice determining whether or not to switch/blend fuel has been made, this sunk cost 
will have no impact on the factor input ratio. Thus I do not explicitly take account of the initial 
capital cost in this analysis. 
8 
 
For the model to be tractable, I assume that the adjustment costs are continuous and linear in 
l.
9
  Specifically, I combine the variable adjustment cost and purchasing cost of low-carbon fuel as 
an augment cost and represent the cost function as a standard linear one. 
 
(, ) lh clh P l Ph =+     
 
where Pl is the sum of both purchasing cost and the variable adjustment cost of low-carbon fuel. 
Implicitly, there is Pl > Ph. 
 
Finally, I denote the emission function as  ( , ) ( ) lh elh l h γ δδ = + , where  l δ  and  h δ  are the 
carbon contents of low- and high-carbon fuel ( l δ  <  h δ ), and γ   is the converting rate from 
carbon to carbon dioxide.  
                                                 
6 In fact, interest rate itself imposes another uncertainty on the optimization problem. To focus the attention on the 
effect of output market uncertainty, here I assume r remains constant. 
7 To include labor (a) and capital (k) inputs in the production function is straightforward and yields an almost 
identical analysis.  
8 Philippe Ambrosi made another point that fuel switching may also be linked to the decision to operate one power 
plant rather than another, and there are no sunk costs involved. 
9 As will be shown later, the abatement cost is strictly convex.   7
 
To analyze the above constrained stochastic dynamic optimization problem, consider a firm 
that is in place for two periods t = 1, 2. The Kuhn-Tucker sufficient conditions for a maximum at 
** * * (,,, ) hlxϖ  yield the following first-order conditions: 
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2
*
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where  * ϖ is the multiplier associated with inequality (3).  *0 ϖ > if and only if the non-negativity 
constraint is binding, i.e. A1 + B1 + x1 – e
*
1 > 0 implies  *0 ϖ = . 
 
Eq.(4) is the Euler-intertemporal condition.
10
  Eq. (5) discloses that producers choose the 
optimal levels of fuel so that the fuel’s marginal value product equals its marginal cost. The 
marginal cost includes both the direct production cost and the opportunity cost of surrendering 
the option to use permits in a future period. Therefore, expectations on the marginal value of a 
unit of allowance in next period  12 ([ ] ) B EV  affect current emission decisions. 
 
The second-period optimization problem is 
 
222
2 2 22 22 2 2 ,, max ( , ) ( , ) ea lhx VP g h l c h l P x =− −     (7) 
                          s.t.   A2 + B2 - e(h2, l2) + x2 = 0       (8) 
 
Eq.(8) shows that firms deplete the pmiert bank in the terminal period. The Lagrangian is  
 




2222 ,,, lhxλ ) is described by the following first-order equations: 
 
     
*
22 a P λ =             ( 1 0 )  
                 ** *
22 2
*
22 '' ' ei f ff Pg c e λ =+    f = l, h     ( 1 1 )  
 
2 λ  can be interpreted as the shadow value of a unit of banked permit in period-2. Eq.(10) says 
that firms will buy or sell permits such that the shadow value of the marginal permit equals to its 
market price. The optimal input mix 
**
22 (, ) lhis given by Eq.(11).  
 
An important feature of the above optimal solution is that it is independent of the level of 
banked permits (B2). The value function in period 2 is only linearly linked to B2 through the 
profit function. Specifically, the value function in Eq.(7) can be written as 
 
                                                 
10 g’f, c’f , e’f (f = l, h) represent the marginal productivity, marginal production cost, and marginal emission rate of 
the two types of fuel. Hereafter, ’ represents the calculation of a derivative.   8
** ** **
2 2 2222 2222 22 2 2222 ( ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( )) [ ( ( ), ( ))] ea V P g hPlP c hPlP P A B e hPlP =− − + −       (12) 
 
where P2 = {Pe2, Pl2, Ph2, Pa2}. Differentiating Eq.(12) with respect to B2 we get the marginal 
revenue product of permits: 
 
     * 2 2 a B VP =                    (13)   
   




12 () a PE P β ϖ =+                     (14) 
 
The right hand side of Eq.(14) is the expected return of holding one unit of permit. It 
consists of two components: expected present permit price in period 2 and a convenience yield 
* ϖ . The left hand side of the equation represents the opportunity cost of carrying an additional 
unit of permit, which is an instantaneous gain from selling it in the spot market. To simplify 
notations while not affect the generally conclusions on the relationship between uncertainty and 
permit trading, I assume the convenience yield related to the scarcity of the permits bank is not a 
factor affecting banking decisions of individual units.  i.e. 
* ϖ = 0. 
 


























hl gg σ =  is the ratio of the marginal productivities of high- and low-carbon fuel.
11 
The right hand side of Eq.(15) is the additional cost an operator has to pay in order to reduce one 
ton of carbon dioxide emission. It reflects both price and productivity differences between low- 
and high-carbon fuel. Following Montgomery (1972), emission abatement costs are defined as 
the difference between the unconstrained profits and the profits in which the firm adopts an 
emission level which is less than the unconstrained emission level. Therefore, the right hand side 
of Eq.(15) presents a notation for marginal abatement cost. 
 
Eq.(15) together with Eq. (14) exhibit the spatial and temporal efficiency properties of a 
tradable emission permit regime: in each period, the marginal abatement costs are equalized 
across firms through the current allowance price (therefore the total pollution reduction cost is 
minimized)
12; the present value of the marginal abatement costs are equalized across time 
periods in an expectation sense. Thus, expectations on higher future permit prices raise the 
current abatement level. 
 
                                                 
11 The expected permit prices are positive implies  /' / ' hl h l gg δ δ > . 
12 This conclusion is based on the assumption that firms have interior solutions, i.e. both low- and high-carbon fuels 
are used. If firms only use one type of fuel, marginal abatement costs are not equalized between firms having 
interior solutions and firms having corner solutions; however, an emission trading program still yields a cost 
effective result.   9










=                     (16) 
 
Eqs. (14) and (15) show that firms have incentives to save permits for future use (forward 
banking) every time they expect the discounted future permit price to be greater than the current 
market price; at the industry level, such forward banking will drive up the current permit prices, 
as well as the current marginal abatement costs, to reflect the expectation of future permit prices. 
Eq.(16) shows that a direct result of forward banking is to prevent the expected permit price from 
increasing at a rate higher than the interest rate.   
III (ii) Uncertainty, Banking and Emission 
Although price is given for each individual unit in the permit market, allowance price is 
endogenously determined by the aggregate behavior of the generating units. Previous theoretical 
analysis of emission permit trading reveals that when allowed to trade with one another in a 
competitive allowance market, units will collectively behave like a central planner who 
efficiently allocates emission permits to each unit in a manner that minimizes total costs (Rubin, 
1996; Schennach, 2000; Feng and Zhao, 2006). This insight allows me to model the aggregate 
industrial behavior as a single representative unit and solve the equivalent and simpler problem 
without considering internal spatial trading. Assuming the representative agent uses low- and 
high-carbon fuel to produce electricity according to the Cobb-Douglas production function
13 
1 (, ) glh G lh
α α − = , where G is a productivity parameter, and 0 <α <1 is the share of low-carbon 
fuel. To avoid confusing the issues of increasing price volatility with increasing price trends, I 
consider electricity price Pe evolves following a mean-preserving stochastic process with the 
mean equal to  e P . Formally, I define the probability distribution function of Pe as  (,) e fPθ  such 
that  
2 (, )     ee Pd f P θ θ ⋅= ∀ ∫  
where  θ   is an index of the mean-preserving spread and if  ' θ θ > ,  (, ) f θ ⋅ second-order 
stochastically dominates  ( , ') f θ ⋅  (or  ( , ') f θ ⋅  is more risky than  (, ) f θ ⋅ ) . Therefore, the value of 
θ  characterizes the level of market-wide risk. The representative firm’s optimization problem in 
period-2 shown below is simplified by leaving out the term x. 
   22 2 2 2 max ( , ) ( , ) e VP g l h c l h =−                 (17) 
s. t.              22 2 2 2 (, ) ( ) lh B el h l h γ δδ == +                                        (18) 
There is no closed-form solution for the above optimization problem. Nonetheless, I prove 
analytically in Appendix A that the marginal profitability of permits / VB ∂ ∂ , or the permit price 
Pa, is convex in the stochastic variable Pe. This leads to a negative relationship between ex ante 
emissions and the level of uncertainties about electricity prices.  
 
                                                 
13 In Appendix A I extend the model to a more general CES production function and prove that the conclusions do 
not change.    10
Proposition 1. Increasing uncertainty over electricity price generates lower ex ante emissions 
and higher banking in the following sense: For  ' θ θ > ,  (' ) ( ) e BP Bθ >  and  (' ) () ii ee θ θ < , where 
θ   is the mean-preserving spread of electricity price, B  is  the aggregate stock of banked 
emission permits of the industry, and ei  is the individual ex ante emissions. 
Proof.  I prove in Appendix A that the marginal profitability of permits is convex with respect to 
Pe. It follows directly from Jensen’s inequality that an increase in the mean preserving spread of 
Pe increases the expected marginal value of permits. According to Eq.(15), in anticipation of 
higher expected future marginal value of permits, firms will reduce ex ante emissions by 
increasing the current marginal abatement costs, which leads to an increased aggregate stock of 
allowances at the industry level, 
 
It is essential that the marginal value of allowances be convex in electricity prices to derive 
the above conclusion. This convexity reveals an asymmetric distribution of future marginal 
values of allowances due to output prices change. To understand the intuition, note that because 
the total number of allowances is fixed, and is less than the emissions expected to produce by all 
of the affected units, the rise of electricity prices increases the counterfactual emissions, as well 
as the total required pollution reduction. Since abatement costs are convex (more discussion of 
this property in the next section), marginal abatement cost rises with the quantity of abatement. 
Therefore, when electricity price increases, the marginal abatement cost increases faster then it 
decreases when electricity price falls. This means that the potential gain from saving an 
additional unit of permit is higher when electricity price increases than the potential loss when 
electricity price decreases. When uncertainty is more pronounced, very high and very low 
electricity prices become more likely, and this asymmetric relationship becomes more salient. In 
the presence of extreme prices, firms would have a higher incentive to save permits as the 
potential gain is much higher than the potential loss.  
 
In addition, when there are multiple time periods, the convexity effect also works through 
firms’ ability to vary the input of permits in response to the resolution of uncertainty. When there 
is a ”bad” shock such that the stock of permits is larger than the desired stock of permits, firms 
can choose not to use extra permits. Thus, the marginal gain from saving a unit of permit today 
equals max [0,  21 aa PP β − ]. A “good” shock is unchecked, while a “bad” shock is bounded below. 
Therefore, a unit of permit is like a set of American call options on future production, which is 
worth more when good and bad outcomes are more extreme with the same expected mean value.  
 
Based on a similar analysis, I show in Appendix B that the marginal value of permits is also 
a convex function of input costs: the prices of low- and high-carbon fuel. The intuition follows 
the same line: the fluctuation of input costs changes the counterfactual emission level, leading to 
an asymmetric probability distribution for the marginal profit of permits: negative shocks which 
increase the input costs will reduce the marginal value of permits less than positive shocks will 
increase them, Hence, in equilibrium more permits will be saved in presence of a mean 
preserving spread in the distribution of Pl or Ph which raises the expected marginal profitability 
of permits.  
 
Lemma 1. The greater the uncertainty in input costs Pl and Ph, the lower are the ex ante 
emissions.   
   11
Proof.  See Appendix B. 
 
To be noticed, that assuming perfectly competitive allowance market, the above conclusions 
are derived regardless of firms’ market position (net seller or buyer) and the initial allocation of 
allowances.  
III.(iii) Imperfect Competition and Return to Scale 
Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 are proved under the assumptions that individual firms are 
price-takers and production technology is linearly homogeneous. In this section, I discuss the 
role of perfect competition and returns to scale. I show that imperfect competition in an 
electricity market and decreasing returns to scale do not affect the negative relationship between 
uncertainty and emission. However, this negative relationship may not be robust to increasing 
returns to scale or imperfect competition in the permit market.  
A. Imperfect Electricity Market 
To isolate the impact of imperfect competition in electricity market, assume the technology 
is still described by a homogenous of degree one Cobb-Douglas production function:
1 gG l h
α α − = . 
Suppose an individual firm faces an isoelastic demand curve
(1 )/
e Pg W
ϕϕ − = , whereϕ  (1 ϕ ≥ ) is a 
markup coefficient with ϕ =1 corresponding to perfect competition. W is an exogenous 
stochastic demand shifter that captures industry-wide shocks. Under these conditions, the value 
function is equal to: 
 
1 () lh VW G l h P lP h
αα ε − =− −                             (20) 
 
where  1/ ε ϕ = ,  1 ε ≤ , ε  can be considered as the return-to-scale parameter. Appendix C shows 
that with a value function described by Eq.(20), the convexity of the marginal value of permits in 
output price and input costs persists. Therefore, the fact that an electricity market may not be 
perfectly competitive does not affect the conclusion regarding the negative relationship between 
uncertainty and ex ante emissions given constant returns to scale and perfect competition in 
permit market (as well as risk neutrality).  
 
This result confirms the intuition of the above analysis. Recall that a crucial insight from 
Eq.(12) is that abatement decisions do not depend on either past or future permit stocks. This 
lack of “intertemporal links” holds true as long as firms are price takers in the permit market and 
does not depend on the elasticity of the demand curve facing individual firms in the electricity 
market. Therefore, an industry-wide shock will have a similar impact on abatement decisions for 
a competitive firm and a monopolist with constant returns to scale in the electricity market: how 
many permits is saved now affects profits in the future, but not the level of emissions in the 
future. As such, any increase in the expected marginal profitability of permits, including the one 
caused by an increase in market uncertainty raises the emission banking today.  
 
One concern about above analysis is that the industry itself may face a downward-sloping 
demand curve even when individual firms are perfectly competitive and have constant returns to 
scale. When price is endogenously determined by the industry output, the amount a price can rise 
under good industry-wide outcomes is limited by the entry of new firms and the expansion of 
existing ones. If investment is irreversible, as shown by Pindyck (1993), there is no similar   12
mechanism to prevent price from falling under bad demand outcomes. As a result, a mean-
preserving distribution of future output prices might not be sustained. However, because fossil 
fuel fired peak power plants which are usually the marginal producers, can be fairly easily turned 
on or shut down in response to the realized market price, the possibility of an asymmetric 
distribution of future output price is reduced. That is the operational flexibility of peak load 
power plants weakened the notion of irreversibility which is instrumental in Pindyck(1993)’s 
analysis.  
B. Return to Scale 
Analysis so far assumes constant returns to scale. Relaxing this assumption, however, does 
not convey any additional difficulty. Eq.(20) reveals that a decrease in returns to scale operates 
exactly like an increase in the markup coefficient and vice versa. Therefore, conclusions of 
Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 fully carry over to the case of decreasing returns to scale.  
 
The above result has an intuitive interpretation. Note that Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 hinge 
on the convexity of abatement costs. In principle, this convexity arises from decreasing marginal 
productivity of factor inputs.
14 To see this, observe from Eq.(15) that marginal abatement costs is 
positively related to the ratio of marginal products of high- and low-carbon fuel (σ ). Because of 
declining marginal productivity, when producers use a greater share of low-carbon fuel to reduce 
emissions, σ  increases as the marginal product of low-carbon fuel declines relative to that of 
high-carbon fuel. Therefore, abatement costs are convex in the sense that a lower level of 
emissions is associated with higher abatement costs at the margin. In obtaining this result, 
diminishing marginal productivity is the paramount factor. Because decreasing returns to scale 
(so as constant returns to scale) guarantees diminishing marginal productivity (given the 
production function is quasi-concave)
15, the negative relationship between emissions and 
uncertainty holds in the presence of decreasing returns to scale resulting from imperfect 
competition or diseconomies of scale technology, or both. Note that some cases of increasing 
returns may also satisfy diminishing marginal productivity. For example, suppose 1 ε > , but 
01 αε << ; the marginal productivity of l decreases with the increase of l.  However, as the 
returns to scale (ε ) becomes larger and larger, from the insights gleaned above, the inverse 
relationship between emissions and uncertainty would eventually lose its strength.  
C. Imperfect Permit Market 
So far we have assumed a competitive permit market, where the distribution of future 
allowance price is independent of an individual firm’s abatement decisions. The effects of 
uncertainty are mediated through the equilibrium behavior of all firms and the resulting impact 
on prices of an allowance market. A logical question to explore is what if at least one of the units 
exercises market power in the allowance market. In this case, the current emission of the 
dominant firm would affect the expected path of the marginal value of permits. For a dominant 
firm, Eq.(14) becomes 
 














          ( 2 1 )    
                                                 
14 Increasing marginal abatement costs or decreasing marginal productivity both imply that the firm attains a regular 
minimum in solving the problem.  
15 A formal mathematical proof is available upon request.   13
 
The price function Pa and its relationship with Pe is intractable without further assumption of 
the price- or quantity-setting behavior of the dominant firm. However, as the dominant firm has 
the flexibility to make ex post decisions on x2 after the demand for output market is known, the 
permit price Pa becomes less convex with respect to Pe. When the ability of the dominant firm to 
affect the permit price increases, the firm would respond less and less to changes in the level of 
uncertainty. Qualitatively, I show that imperfect competition in an permit market threatens the 
negative relationship between price uncertainty and ex ante emissions.  Further rigorous analysis 
is needed based upon more detailed assumptions of the market structure of the permit market and 
the strategic behavior of a dominant firm. 
 
 
IV. Empirical Analysis 
 
Building on previous discussions on the dynamics of intertemporal emissions trading under 
uncertainty, this section empirically explores the electricity utilities’ responses regarding 
emissions reduction to price fluctuations in the U.S. electricity markets.
16 The empirical analysis 
is based on a panel dataset consisting of 207 Phase I coal-fired generating units from 1996 to 
2004.  In many ways, the U.S. SO2 allowance trading program can be compared to the emerging 
global carbon dioxide trading market. With 10 years of observation data and many lessons 
learned from the SO2 allowance market, to study SO2 trading occurred in the U.S. provides a 
unique opportunity to estimate the implications of different features of the global carbon dioxide 
trading program, including the impact of uncertainty on future development of the global carbon 
market. 
 
The SO2 allowance trading program, also known as the Acid Rain Program, was established 
under Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. By creating a national clean air 
market, it was a grand application of a market-based regulatory approach to achieve emission 
reduction goals. The basic idea behind permit trading is simple. The regulatory agency first sets a 
cap that limits the total SO2 emissions by more than 40% from their 1980 level (from 18.9 
million tons in 1980 to 8.9 million tons by 2001). It then divides the quantity up to a number of 
tradable allowances and allocates them to individual firms based on their historical heat input. 
Each allowance grants the holder the right to emit one ton of SO2. Firms that can reduce 
emissions relatively cheaply may increase their profits by selling extra allowances; while those 
that find it expensive to reduce emissions can buy extra allowances from the market. The SO2 
allowance trading program institutionalized a couple of innovations in that it not only allows 
unlimited trading of permits among firms, but also allows permits to be traded over time. 
Therefore, power producers who can reduce emissions below the number of allowances they 
hold may sell allowances to other firms, or bank them for future use. The only limitation the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) imposes on the trading program is that firms cannot 
borrow allowances from their future allocation. At the “true-up” date (usually at the end of 
March of each year), each unit must submit enough allowances to cover its emissions for that 
year.  
                                                 
16 I do not test the effect of coal prices uncertainties. As coal is the most abundant and affordable energy source in 
the United States, its price in fact remains quite stable during the sample period.     14
 
Another important feature of this program is that it is a phased-in program. Phase I began in 
1995 and affected 263 units at 110 mostly coal-burning (and a few oil-fired units) electric utility 
plants located in 21 eastern and Midwestern states. Phase I units had emissions greater than 2.5 
pounds of SO2 /mmBtu and a generating capacity greater than 100 megawatts (MW). Phase II 
began in the year 2000. It establishes a permanent cap of 8.95 million per year and affects all 
existing utility units with an output capacity greater than 25 MW, and all new utility units. 
 
Figure 1 shows the annual emission cap, aggregated emissions and banked allowances from 
1995 to 2004. It is apparent that the temporal dimension is a key component of this trading 
program. Indeed from 1995 to 1999, 11.65 million allowances had  been banked, which  was 
about 30% of the total allowances allocated during Phase I.
17  These extra allowances were 
produced through reducing emissions in early periods below the allowable standard.  
 
The main reason for units to bank permits is due to the phased-in aspect of the program: an 
allowance is perceived to be worth more in later years under the stricter cap of the Phase II. As 
expected, the bank accumulated during Phase I started being drawn down in year 2000, easing 
the transition to Phase II.  However, the size of the bank generated in Phase I was unexpectedly 
large. Some argue that banking in this program has been excessive and was economically 
inefficient (Ellerman, et al., 2000; Smith, et al., 1998). In addition, the draw-down rate at the 
beginning of Phase I was also lower than previously expected (Ellerman and Montero, 2005). In 
the following, I show that part of the bank can be explained by the increased electricity price 
volatility during electricity market restructuring in recent years.  
 
The implementation of the acid rain program happens to have coincided with electricity 
restructuring which dramatically changed the way the power industry was structured and 
regulated over the past decade. Before restructuring, under rate-of-return regulation, electricity 
price is set administratively by the regulatory agency on the basis of average production cost. 
After Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued Orders 888 and 889 in 1996, a 
number of auction based wholesale markets were established.  In these markets firms bid to 
supply power and the dispatch order was set by the bids. Since electricity has been traded in 
these wholesale markets, uncertainty becomes a salient feature in the electricity market. In fact, 
electricity price volatility has exceeded that of any other commodity market in recent years.   
 
 In what follows, the model specification, data sources and empirical estimation results are 
discussed.  
 
IV (i) Econometric Specification 
 
In this section, I lay out the underlying econometric specifications for empirical tests and 
describe the dependent and independent variables.  
 
                                                 
17 The number of banked allowances does not include allowances sold at public auction each year, nor does it 
include the contribution from substitution units that entered or exited the market in different years.    15
I assume a generating unit i has a production function of the following form:  
ii ab
ii gG l h =    
(ai > 0, bi > 0); electricity price is given by 
1 i
ei PW g
ε − =  . Recall that W is an exogenous process 
that influences the value of Pe and ε  is the elasticity of demand.  When the unit is a price-taker 
in the electricity market, there are ε =1 and W = Pe . 
 
Multiplying factor inputs l and h on both sides of Eqs.(5) and (26) (intertemporal first-order  
conditions for competitive and regulated units, respectively) gives the input demand functions 
for l and h: 
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(f = l, h),  (1 ) (1 ) ii t i t NRτ + + =  , Ri is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if 
unit i is subject to ROR regulation, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Substituting l and h from Eqs. (27) and (28) to the expression for e, we get a emission 
function:  
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Dividing both sides of Eq.(29) by git and taking logs yield 
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Eq. (30) shows that the total emissions of unit i is determined by exogenous demand shifter 
W, the output level git, current and expected factor input prices (Pl and Ph), and the current and 
expected profit regulations (M and N), a series of unit specific characteristics (ai, bi,  i ε ), and 
expected future allowance prices E[Pa(t+1)], which as postulated by the theoretical analysis, is 
positively correlated with the variance of Peit.  The probability of a potential stockout measured 
by  i ϖ  may also affect emission decisions. 
  
Therefore, emission rates can be estimated by the following reduced form  
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where the dependent variable is the observed annual average SO2 emission rate (in log forms) of 
unit i in calendar year t. Emission rate is calculated by dividing the total annual emissions (tons) 
by the annual electricity output in megawatt hours (MWh).  
   16
eit P Δ   is the volatility of electricity prices.  It is the key variable of interest in gauging the 
effect of output price uncertainty on decision makers’ perception of future allowance prices and 
multi-period emissions distribution decisions. Observations of monthly fuel purchasing database 
reveal that plants frequently purchase coal from spot markets during the year. Therefore, 
decisions as to how much of each type of coal to buy and how many allowances to hold till later 
periods can be adjusted in response to the monthly electricity price fluctuations.  I measure eit P Δ  
as the standard deviation of the percentage change (between two adjacent months) of monthly 
average electricity price in the state where unit i is located. As we tend to see higher overall 
underlying prices in highly volatile periods, this definition facilitates normalizations and 
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where t indexes year and m indexes month.  eitn P  is the monthly average retail electricity price to 
industrial customers in state  i during month m year t.  
 
The coefficient of  et P Δ  provides a measure of the elasticity of annual average emission rate 
to electricity price volatility. A negative coefficient will provide supporting evidence for the 
theoretical prediction in previous sections. 
 
The above analysis implicitly assumes current price fluctuation as a proxy for expected price 
uncertainty in the future. One concern with this specification is whether current price uncertainty 
reflects plant operators’ expectation of future price uncertainty at the time of making operation 
decisions. To evaluate the possibility that historical price uncertainty does not provide insights 
into expectation of future price changes, I also assume mangers perfectly predict price volatility 
in the future ( (1 ) et P + Δ ), and test for the response of current emission rate to future price 
fluctuation. This alternative specification does not change the result qualitatively. 
 
Given input costs, an increase in electricity prices will increase the marginal value of 
allowances. According to Eq.(A6), the higher the marginal value of allowances, the higher the 
input ratio for low-sulfur coal, which implies a lower emission rate. Therefore, the coefficient 
associated with Pe is expected to be negative.   
 
Pt is a price vector including the price of allowances Pat; low-sulfur coal price Plt,; high-
sulfur coal price Pht , and retail electricity price to industrial customers Pet.  
 
Current price Pat is an indicator of the market’s perception of allowances future prices. A 
higher Pat would reduce current emissions and the coefficient of Pat is likely to be negative. 
 
The coefficient associated with low-sulfur coal price is expected to be positive, while the 
sign of the coefficient of high-sulfur coal price is ambiguous. Holding the output price constant, 
a change in input fuel prices has two substitution effects: the substitution between the two types   17
of coal, and the substitution between low-sulfur coal and allowances.
18 When low-sulfur coal 
prices increase, both substitution effects raise emission rates. However, when the high-sulfur 
coal price increases, the two substitution effects work in opposite ways, leaving the sign of Pht 
indeterminate.  
 
To estimate the impact of ROR regulations on emissions behavior, I construct two dummy 
variables RetailAcessit and Transitit. RetailAcessit takes the value 1 if the state where unit i is 
located has begun retail access to industrial customers during year t, 0 otherwise; Transitit  takes 
the value 1 when unit i is located in a state that is in a transitional period of electricity 
restructuring but has not yet started retail access, 0 otherwise. I define a state undergoing 
transition to retail competition when any one of the following two events occurs: (1) PUC issues 
a final order that contains a date by which all PUC-regulated utilities in the state must open their 
markets to retail competition; (2) the PUC has required retail restructuring filings from its 
regulated utilities in preparation for competition by a particular date, even if it has not yet issued 
a final comprehensive order. Based on previous analysis, if deregulated units have higher 
incentive to reduce emissions while transitional units are less motivated to bank permits, then the 
coefficients of RetailAcessit and Transitit would be negative and positive, respectively.  
 
Zit is a vector of unit specific characteristics that may also determine emission performances, 
which include:  
 
SCRUBERit, a dummy constructed to be 1 if a scrubber is installed to reduce SO2 emissions. 
Scrubber can remove up to 90% of SO2 emitted during the production process. The coefficient 
associated with SCRUBERit is likely to be significantly negative. 
 
 AGEit, the age of the boiler installed, calculated by using the calendar year to minus the year 
of initial operation.  Given that age and emission performance may not be in a linear relationship, 
I estimate the model allowing AGEit to enter with a quadratic specification.   
 
HEATRATEit is a measure of unit efficiency in transferring energy into electricity. It is 
calculated by dividing the net kilowatt hours (KWh) of power output by the Btu content
19 of the 
fuel input. The sign of the coefficient for HEATRATEit is expected to be negative because of the 
inverse relationship between heat rate and production efficiency. 
 
CAPi is the design capacity of the boiler expressed in megawatts (MW). The variable is 
included to capture possible economies or diseconomies of scale. As suggested by previous 
literature (Baumeister et al., 1980; Joskow and Schmalensee, 1987), the underlying 
thermodynamic properties of a steam cycle imply that increasing the size of the boiler should 
reduce the unit’s heat rate, at least within some range. However, the advantage of larger size 
tends to deteriorate as scale becomes very large. With this a priori on the effect of boiler scale, I 
include the first and second order terms of CAPi in the regression. 
 
                                                 
18 Recall in Appendix A I prove a negative relationship between fuel costs and allowance prices (Eq.[A14]). 
Therefore, changes in input fuel costs also changes the allowance prices.  
19 Btu stands for British thermal unit,  a unit of energy frequently used to describe the heat value (energy content) of 
fuels.    18
WORKLOADit is the ratio between the actual operating hours during year t and the 
maximum working hours of a year (8640 hours). Emission rate may also be affected by operating 
conditions. For example, it is generally understood that frequent ramp up and down tends to 
increase the level of emissions. I constructed the variable WORKLOADit to capture the impact of 
different operating practices between base load and peak load plants on emissions. The 
coefficient of WORKLOADit is expected to be negative. 
 
INITIALit is the initial allocation of allowances (tons) issued by the EPA. Although emission 
decisions of a price-taking unit are generally independent of its allowances endowment, 
INITIALit can be negatively correlated with the value of convenience yield ( it ϖ ) when non-
negativity constraints are binding.
20   However, since the non-negativity constraints are 
inconsequential during Phase I of the trading program, I expect estimation on INITIALi to be 
positive, but the effect is likely to be tenuous.  
 
MUNIi is a dummy equal to 1 when the generating unit is municipally or cooperatively 
owned, and 0 otherwise. I interact MUNIi with the measure of electricity price uncertainty eit P Δ . 
An extensive literature has discussed the relative inefficiency of publicly owned facilities. If 
MUNIi units are less cost conscious, operational activity of these units will be less responsive to 
output price fluctuations. Therefore, I expect coefficient of the interaction term to be positive. 
 
Finally, I also include year and state dummies Tt and Sj. Year dummies can capture year-
specific differences in emission performance common to all units, such as secular technology or 
productivity shocks. State dummies are included to control time-invariant state specific 
regulatory policies that may influence the cross-sectional variation in emissions. For example, 
many generating units were subject to sulfur restrictions contained in State Implementation Plans, 
which where enforced prior to the Acid Rain Program and are still in effect. Some of these local 
regulations are more stringent than those of the Acid Rain Program, and therefore consistently 
affect the emission rates of the units in those states.
21  
 
An unobservable time-invariant unit specific characteristic is represented by  i α  and  is 
assumed to affect emission performance as well. The disturbance termε  is assumed to be an 
idiosyncratic shock to operating performance drawn from an identical and independent 
distribution (iid) 
2 ~( 0 ,) it N ε ε σ .   0 β , 2 β , …,  5 β , ν  and κ  are the coefficients.  
 
As a direct analog to Eq.(31), I also test if the percentage change in the amount of 
allowances banked between two time periods has any bearing on output price uncertainty (the 
dependent variable is [Bt+1 – Bt]/Bt).  Because allowance banking is negatively related to total 
emissions, the coefficients of the above explanatory variables would have similar interpretations 
but are expected to have opposite signs. 
             
                                                 
20 For example, when initial allocation increases, a potential stockout is less likely to occur and the convenience 
yield becomes less important. 
21 Specifically, states that have such regulations are Kansas, Michigan, Wisconsin, New York and New Hampshire.  
These states had enacted acid rain laws or taken regulatory actions to reduce SO2 emissions that were in effect by 
1993 and would observe lower emission levels overall.   19
IV. (ii) Disturbance Term Structure and Alternative Specifications 
 
The regression model (31) is based on the assumption that units are price-takers in the 
allowance market. One potential concern is that the equilibrium allowance price could be 
endogenously determined by units that abuse market power. Emission price endogeneity may be 
particularly relevant in the first couple of years of the trading program when the market was not 
liquid enough and the price determination process might have involved significant interplay of 
supply and demand between only a few companies.  
 
To test for the possibility of allowance prices endogeneity, I use the annual average natural 
gas wellhead price
22 as an instrument for the allowance price. Natural gas and coal are competing 
fuels for electricity generation. Fluctuations in natural gas prices have the potential to influence 
the market share of coal-fired generation, which is a major driving factor of allowance prices. 
However, since natural gas prices are generally determined by weather conditions (hot summer 
days, cold winter days), the prices of substituting fuel (oil and gasoline), and economic activities,  
may not be directly correlated with individual units’ emission rates. As robustness check, I 
dropped potential noisy observations for the early years (1996 and 1997) and compare the results 
of this reduced sample estimation with that of the full sample.  
 
In addition to allowances price endogeneity, the endogeneity of low- and high-sulfur coal 
costs may arise as an issue if coal prices are determined by the demand for coal. A more likely 
situation is that because coal is a differentiated product in terms of both quality (sulfur content, 
Btu content, moisture content)
 23 and location, coal suppliers (producers and carriers) may have 
great latitude in formulating prices, while electric generating units are price-takers in coal 
markets,. When pricing decisions are correlated with unobservable factors affecting a unit’s 
choice for coal and its emission performance, estimations ignoring this correlation would be 
biased.  
 
Given the potential endogeneity of coal prices, following Ellerman and Montero (1998), I 
use the distance from a unit to the Power River Basin (PRB) in Wyoming and Montana as a 
proxy for the prices of the low-sulfur coal available to the units.
 24 The rationale for using this 
variable is that PRB produces most of low-sulfur coal in the U.S. with the cheapest coal-mine 
prices, while transportation costs factor importantly into the delivered price of coal.
 25 A unit’s 
location in relation to PRB coal will to some extent reflect the actual cost of low-sulfur coal or 
other competing coals.  However, as Ellerman and Montero (1998) and Montero (1999) point out, 
the distance to the PRB coal does not affect low-sulfur coal price uniformly. In particular, low-
sulfur coal from central Appalachia becomes more competitive for units 1000 miles away from 
Wyoming. To reflect this nonlinear relationship, I included a third degree polynomial to control 
for the distance. It is expected that low-sulfur coal price will first increase with the increase of 
                                                 
22 Wellhead price is the value at the mouth of the well. In general, the wellhead price is considered to be the sales 
price obtainable from a third party in an arm’s length transaction.  
23 Some fuel contracts specify more than a dozen attributes of coal qualities.  
24 Ideally, to control for the potential fuel price endogeneity, I would estimate hedonic price functions for fuel.  
However, it is not possible to identify all of the relevant fuel attributes that might be important in determining fuel 
prices, such as the fuel grandability, fuel size or the chemical content of the fuel. 
25 In fact, for some western coal hauls, transportation costs account for up to 75% of delivered fuel costs. (EIA, 
1995),   20
distance to PRB coal and then decrease as more alternative low-sulfur coals become available. 
The distance variable and low-sulfur coal price premium are both included as proxies for low- 
and high-sulfur coal prices. 
 
Specifications in (31) establish correlations between state restructuring activity and emission 
level. Previous studies (Joskow, 1997; White, 1996) suggest that a major motivation for 
electricity restructuring was to remedy the problem of high electricity prices in the Northeast and 
California. Under ROR regulation, PUCs set the price of electricity based on the determination 
of recoverable costs. If dirty and less efficient coal power plants in the Northeast contributed to 
regional high electricity prices by passing on high environmental control costs to consumers, 
which in turn induced restructuring, regulatory variables RetailAccess and Transit may be 
endogenous to emission rates.  A fixed effects model would be able to address the endogeneity 
concern. A fixed effects model levels out the inherent variations in unit operation that potentially 
correlated with the emission rates, and therefore we can still test how changes in price volatilities 
changes emission rates for the same unit across time periods.
26  
 
Finally, results could be affected by sample attrition issues due to plants being removed 
from the reporting database. In fact, starting in 1998, many plants were divested to non-utilities 
and dropped from the sample because cost data of nonutility generating facilities are not reported 
to the public. If divestiture decisions were driven by unobservable unit specific characteristics, 
which make them systematically different from non-diverstitured plants, for example, if 
divestitured plants tend to be more competitive and produce fewer emissions given a level of 
output, then the estimation would also be biased. To assess if divestiture creates an attrition bias, 
I obtain the estimation results from a balanced sub-panel composed of units that remain in the 
database through 2004. The sample selection problem would be most severe in this specification 
if observations were not missing at random. 
 
The stochastic disturbances in the estimating equations are assumed to be correlated across 
observations.
 27 To obtain robust standard errors, I adjusted standard errors for clustering by unit 
in the following estimations.  
 
IV. (iii) Data  
 
I began construction of the dataset with all privately and public owned Phase I coal-fired 
generating units. For these units, I constructed a panel dataset beginning in 1996, the first year 
for which coal prices are available, and ending in 2004, the last year for which the allowances 
trading data were updated. The data are collected and merged from several data sources to obtain 
information concerning annual aggregate productions, quality and quantity of coal used, and SO2 
                                                 
26 Fixed effects model is not sufficient to avoid endogeneity bias if restructuring policies are adopted in response to 
the trend in operating performance. Given that restructuring decisions were generally made before 2000, I conducted 
reduced sample estimation based on observations from 2000 to 2004. This alternative specification does not change 
the magnitude and significance of the results from the full sample; therefore, suggest that the endogeneity of 
regulatory statuses variables may not be a particular concern. 
27 Estimated average first-order autocorrelation coefficients indicate  it u is likely to be serially correlated. In the 
emission rate equation, the coefficient is 0.26 in the fixed effects model; in the percentage change of annually 
banked allowance model, the coefficient is -0.38 in the fixed effects model. The likelihood ratio test also shows 
evidence of cross-sectional heteroskedasticity.    21
emitted during the production process,  allowances allocated and banked, electricity prices, input 
fuel prices, regulatory statuses and a variety of unit-level characteristics. This merging process 
reduced the sample size, both because of differences in units covered among datasets and 
because divestitures removed the plants from the reporting database after 1998. The final dataset 
is unbalanced and is composed of 207 Phase I coal-fired generating units. All prices are adjusted 
to real terms using a 5% discount rate and presented in 1996 dollars. Details of the dataset 
collection and construction procedures are described in Appendix D.  
 
Table II presents summary statistics. Table III gives the unit-year observations on the 
number of units that have been affected by electricity restructuring, installed scrubbers, 
experienced fuel switching, or avoided fuel blending. Table III shows that there are rich 
variations in fuel inputs and regulatory statuses of the units in both longitudinal and cross-
sectional dimensions. In contrast, the number of scrubbers installed remains almost constant 
(except for sample attrition that reduces the number) suggesting that changes in emission rates 
may not be initiated by the installation of scrubbers.  
 
I also calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure market concentration in 
the allowance trading market each year from 1995 to 2004. Generally, the largest seller or buyer 
(at the plant level) of allowances has a market share no larger than 3% and the HHI is 
consistently lower than 100 across years, which suggests that market power may not be a 
significant issue in the allowance market.  
 
IV. (iv) Estimation Results 
 
This section presents estimation results for model (31). I also estimate a number of 
alternative specifications to investigate potential endogeneity biases and found that they do not 
affect the results.  
 
Table IV reports results from estimating equation (31) using the log of units’ annual average 
emission rate as the dependent variable (ln[EmissionRate]). Column (1) and (2) report results 
from unit fixed and random effects models. A Hausman test suggests that the unobservable error 
term  i α  is correlated with at least one of the explanatory variables. Therefore, only the fixed 
effects model yields a consistent and unbiased estimation. Nonetheless, the estimated 
coefficients of variable  et P Δ  are similar and are both negative and statistically significant from 
zero. This result is consistent with the theoretical prediction of a negative correlation between 
emission rate and electricity price volatility. In particular, based on the fixed effects specification, 
a one percent increase in price volatility is associated with a decrease in unit’s annual average 
emission rate by 0.88%. This means a one-standard deviation increase in electricity price 
volatility would induce a sample “average” unit to reduce annual aggregate emissions by 423 
tons. With a 95 percent confidence interval, the emission reduction would be anywhere from 383 
to 827 tons.  
 
Estimations on the other explanatory variables are generally consistent with prior 
expectations. The estimates on SCRUBBER show that the installation of a scrubber would on 
average markedly reduce emission rates by 91%. Publicly owned units are less responsive to 
electricity price volatilities: the emission rate elasticity of a municipal or cooperatively owned   22
unit is one-third lower than that of an investor owned unit. Estimated coefficient on HEATRATE 
shows that inefficient production is associated with higher pollution emissions. Higher allowance 
prices, as well as higher electricity prices induce lower emission rates; in contrast, there is a 
positive relationship between low- and high-sulfur coal prices and emission rates. However, 
coefficients of these price variables are not statistically significant from zero in the fixed effects 
model. AGE does not have a significant impact on emission rates. The reason could be that 
HEATRATE depletes all explaining power regarding the effect of production efficiency on 
emission performance.   Finally, note that different regulatory statuses do not have significant 
impact on emission rates, although coefficients of both variables RetailAccess and Transit have 
the expected sign.  
 
Column (3) of Table IV presents IV/2SLS estimation results using natural gas wellhead 
price as an instrument for SO2 allowance price. The first stage F-statistics is 22, suggesting that 
natural gas price is not a weak instrument. I compare IV/2SLS estimates with those of the fixed 
effects model. A Hausman test suggests that allowing SO2 allowance price to enter as an 
independent variable yields almost the same estimates as those based on instrumentation. The 
statistics is
2(19) χ  = 24.50 and the P-value is 0.1775. Therefore, the endogeneity of allowance 
price does not seem to be a particular concern. Indeed, using IV/2SLS estimation does not affect 
the estimated coefficient of electricity price volatility in either magnitude or statistic significance. 
 
Column (4) of Table IV reports reduced sample estimation. Potentially noisy observations in 
the early period of the trading program are dropped. The 2004 data are also excluded from the 
analysis. In 2004, the spot price of SO2 allowances, which had been steady at about $200/ton, 
were increased by three-fold after the EPA proposed the Clean Air Interstate Rule that will 
effectively lower the SO2 emission cap by two-thirds beginning in 2010. Although the price 
response to upcoming stricter limits on emissions provides further evidence on units’ 
intertemporal optimization behavior, it may swamp the effect of price volatility on emissions 
trading. Therefore, regression was restricted to the years 1998 through 2003. This alternative 
specification does not qualitatively change coefficient estimation for price volatility although it is 
slightly larger than the one received from the full sample year estimation.  
 
To assess if divestiture creates attrition bias, I obtain the estimation from a balanced sub-
panel composed of units that remain in the database through 2004. The sample selection problem 
would be most severe in this specification if observations were not missing at random. The 
results are given in column (5) of Table IV. The estimated coefficient on  e P Δ  is quite similar to 
those from pervious models, indicating that divestitured units may not be systematically different 
from other units regarding the response in emission decisions to price volatility.  
 
As another robustness check, I collect data on the emission rates of Phase I affected units in 
1993 as a counterfactual to examine if the change in emission rates can be explained by change 
in electricity price volatility. Specifically, I estimate a fixed effects model described by Eq.(33).  
With no changes in price volatility, coefficient of price volatility is expected to be zero. About 90 
units were not in operation in 1993. Therefore, the sample size is reduced to 118 units in this 
regression. The estimated coefficients are reported in column (6) of Table IV. The results are 
fully consistent with expectations. The coefficient of price volatility is statistically significant 
and is negatively correlated with the emission rate change. To be noted, the coefficient   23
associated with SCRUBBER is much smaller compared to those from other models. This result 
again confirms the fact that because most of the scrubbers were installed before the enactment of 
the Acid Rain Program, the installation of scrubbers is not a major factor that drives the 
decreasing trend in emission rates.   
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Overall, results from alternative specifications closely resemble the basic fixed effects 
estimation in column (1). In all cases, the relationship between electricity price volatility and 
emission rate, shown in the first row of Table IV, is statistically negative with an estimated 
elasticity around 0.8% - 0.9%. All four sets of alternative specifications produced qualitatively 
similar results on coefficients of other independent variables as well.  
 
The columns in Table V are structured in a manner similar to those in Table IV. Specifically, 
the first two columns report the results from the fixed effects and random effects models. A 
Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis that the cross-sectional error term  it u is not 
correlated with the other independent variables. Therefore, both the fixed and random effects 
models provide consistent estimations. Nonetheless, in the following, I still report results from 
fixed effects estimation, which are not systematically different from those of a random effects 
model. Table V shows that the coefficients on price volatility are positive and statistically 
distinguishable from zero. Alternative specifications have almost no effect on the estimation 
results on the coefficient of price volatility, except for specification in column (5) which 
corresponds to estimations of the balanced panel dataset. The lower estimated coefficient of  e P Δ  
in column (5) indicates that there could be differences in the elasticity of allowance savings 
between divestitured and non-diversitured units. Recall that the size of a unit’s allowance bank 
(Bi(t+1)) is determined by both levels of emissions (eit) and trading with other units (xit). Given 
that the emission elasticities of these two types of units are similar as suggested by Table IV, the 
difference in estimated coefficients of  e P Δ could be explained by different trading strategies: 
diverstitured units could be more aggressive in purchasing allowances in response to higher 
electricity price fluctuations.  
 
Based on column (2) in Table V, a one percent increase in electricity price volatility is on 
average associated with an increase of 2.46% in the size of the allowance bank. This implies that 
when electricity price volatility increases by a one-standard deviation, a sample “average” unit 
will carry an additional 1027 tons of allowances forward to the next period. The 95% confidence 
interval is between 137 to 1918 tons. Coefficients of other independent variables generally 
remain consistent with prior expectations.  
         
Considering the potential endogeneity of delivered coal prices, I control for units’ location 
in relation to PRB coal (miles) and the observed price difference between low- and high-sulfur 
coal prices. Table VI reports estimation results for emission rate (columns [1] and [2]) and the 
percentage change in annual allowance stocks (columns [3] and [4]) based on these 
specifications. Regressions (2) and (4) reported in Table VI also instrument SO2 allowance prices   24
by natural-gas wellhead price. Coefficients of electricity price volatility are consistent with 
previous estimations in all models. In addition, the three distance coefficients are individually 
statistically significant. The U-shaped profile derived from the distance coefficients echoes the 
results from Ellerman and Montero (1998), suggesting that low-sulfur coal prices fall for units 
900 miles  away from a PRB coal mine.  
 
I use actual price volatility level in 1992 as those that would have prevailed in the absence of 
electricity restructuring and compute the corresponding emission rate on the basis of results of 
model (1) in Table IV. With expected counterfactual price volatility, extra allowances – the 
difference between counterfactual emissions and actual emissions is about 11% of the total 
banked allowances. Similar values are obtained using coefficients from the models (2) – (8). 
Following the same exercise but using the average price volatility level during the pre-
restructuring period (1990-1995) as the counterfactual, the increased price volatility can explain 
about 8% of the total allowances banked by the sample units during Phase I of the acid rain 
program. Similarly, I calculate the counterfactual allowance stock based on estimations gleaned 
from model (2) of Table V. I found increased price volatility can explain 6% of the total banking. 
Using coefficient estimates from models (1) – (8), I found this number will be between 7% to 
10%. 
 
V. Welfare Analysis and Policy Implications 
 
To gain further insight into the effects of uncertainty on the time-series behavior of banking 
and emission, I numerically simulate the banking pattern, emission stream and permit price path 
over time resulting from different price volatilities and contrast them to the results that would 
occur in the absence of uncertainty. Given different social damage functions, I calculate the 
potential welfare impact of increased price volatility and discuss the policy implications.  
 
V (i) Simulation of Emission Trading under Different Price Volatilities 
 
In the following, I analyze emission banking from the perspective of the polluting industry 
and ignore internal spatial trading within the industry. A representative agent is assumed to 
maximize the present discounted value of profit over a planning horizon spanning from 1995 to 
2020 based on a production function  ()
ab g Glh
ε = . The permit market is assumed to be perfectly 
competitive. The optimization problem is described by Eqs.(17) and (18) in section III. In 
addition, I assume the electricity price Pet evolves following a mean-preserving stochastic 
process:  
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where  e P  is the expected mean of the electricity price; q denotes the probability that a price 
moves up or down by θ . Both q and θ  measure the magnitude of uncertainty. To be consistent 
with previous analyses, I vary the value of θ from 0 to 1, while keeping q  constant at 0.3. To   25
focus attention on the impact of uncertainty, I have chosen the realized electricity price in each 
period to be the same at  e P . Annual initial allocation is 7 million tons in the first five years and is 
permanently capped at 3.5 million tons from the year 2000.   Production parameters are chosen 
with the following values: G = 55, a = 0.6, ε =0.9. 
28 Discount ratio β  is assumed to be 0.95. 
Values of the other parameters are chosen as around the sample mean of the empirical data :  e P = 
4.8 cents/KWh, ul = 1.64 lb/mmBTU, uh = 4.41 lb/mmBTU, Pl = 120 cents/mmBTU, Ph = 100 
cents/mmBTU.
29  Permit price is endogenously determined by the operational behavior of the 
agent according to Eq.(A8). The process of simulation is discussed in detail in Appendix E. 
 
Numerical analysis produces robust patterns in the response of banking and emission to the 
increase in output price uncertainty. Figure II depicts the total amount of banked emission 
permits as a function of time. The dashed line corresponds to a scenario in which the price spread 
θ =0.2 and the emission cap remain constant at 7 million tons across all periods. The shaded, 
fuzzy line tracks the actual allowance storage through 2004. All the other lines indicate a two-
stage schedule of declining emission standards (total emissions are capped at 7 million tons from 
1995 to 1999 and at 3.5 million tons after year 2000) with different assumptions about price 
volatility (θ = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, and 1). 
 
Comparing the dashed line with the other solid lines, it is apparent that when price volatility 
is low, tightening environmental standards provide a major incentive for producers to reduce 
emissions below the standards in the early years in order to accumulate credits that can be used 
when standards are more severe. When price volatility becomes significant (θ increases), the 
asymmetric impact of uncertainty plays a more important role in determining the optimal size of 
bank. As anticipated, a price spread of θ  =1 generates the largest number of banked permits 
during Phase I and a zero price volatility generates the fewest. Uncertainty also affects the draw 
down rate of the bank. When there is no uncertainty ( 0 θ = ), the bank is depleted by the year 
2008.  When 1 θ = , the banking period is remarkably extended: the bank continues to grow until 
2011.   
 
Of particular interest to the environmental authority is the effect of uncertainty on the 
emission stream. The annual emissions flows and the cumulative emissions in each year under 
different scenarios of price volatility are plotted in Figures III and IV. As noted, the emission 
stream associated with different price volatilities deviate substantially in the beginning and 
terminal periods. When prices are volatile, it is optimal to emit less in early periods and more in 
later periods. When these uncertainties are high enough, excessive emissions are observed 
towards the end.  
 
                                                 
28 Ideally, I would estimate the production functions based on actual data. However, besides observing purchasing 
choice over low- and high-sulfur coal, there are no data on actual inputs of low- and high-sulfur coal. Production 
factor G is chosen to be large enough so that the emission standard imposes a binding constraint on the production 
decision. As a sensitivity analysis, I analyze the change in G on the results and find it does not change the qualitative 
pattern of the results.  
29 The price premium of low-sulfur coal, considering the coal blending adjustment cost, is chosen at 20 
cents/mmBTU. I examine the importance of the value on the results in the sensitivity analysis.    26
Also noted from Figures III and IV is that the size of early emission reductions is significant. 
Based on the numerical analysis, when  1 θ = , producers would have reduced emissions by 48% 
more than  when  0 θ =   during the first 5 years of the program; with  0.2 θ =   or 0.4, early 
emission reductions are at the level of 5% and 14%, respectively, which are in the same order of 
magnitude as the elasticity estimated in previous empirical analysis.  
 
Figure V contains the present value permit price path under different price uncertainties. 
Permit price equals the marginal abatement cost. Therefore, Figure V corresponds to Figure III in 
the sense that the higher the emission level, the lower the permit price. For the high variance 
cases, permit prices are extremely high initially and plummet at the end. It is worth mentioning 
that the expected price differs from the realized price. Producers bank emission credits so as to 
equilibrate expected present value price across compliance periods. However, when uncertainty 
is extremely high, banking does little to smooth the actual price series.  
 
The simulation model assumes specific parameter values for the production function and 
input and output prices. To test the sensitivity of results to these assumptions, a number of 
simulations were run with different values for q, G, a, b, Pl, and Ph. Simulation results on total 
banked permits under different scenarios are shown in Table VII. The results indicate that the 
qualitative conclusions do not hinge on the specific parameter values chosen. In addition, as 
shown in the first two rows of Table VII, emission banking is much larger when the probability 
of price movement, q, increases from 0.3 to 0.4, confirming the relationship between uncertainty 
and emission banking from another perspective. 
 
V.(II) Welfare Analysis  
 
From the standpoint of economic efficiency, uncertainty shifts emission abatement to the 
earlier periods, therefore raising abatement costs because of the discounting effect.   
Assume 0.95 β = , when θ  increases from 0 to 1, the sum of the discounted net payoff is reduced 
by 9%; when  0.85 β = , this number reaches to 20%.  Furthermore, high initial compliance costs 
generated by high uncertainty would deter new entrants and have a negative impact on the 
development of competitive output markets and the emerging environmental markets. Although 
it is generally believed that intertemporal trading creates compliance flexibility that reduces 
abatement costs and increase efficiency, uncertainty may dampen the cost saving properties of 
banking.   
 
In addition to cost considerations, depending on the nature of the pollutants, early abatement 
also has different important environmental implications. If the pollutants, such as greenhouse 
gases, create stock damage, voluntary early reduction would yield significant environmental 
benefits. However, in a finite planning horizon, early abatement increases the degree to which 
firms will concentrate emissions to in later time periods and raise the potential of emission spikes. 
If the pollutants create flow damages and if the damage function is convex, emission spikes can 
impose increased health hazards or even trigger the threshold effect. Emission spikes could also 
be associated with periods of market structure change. I simulate an exemplary situation in 
which the price spread remains at θ  = 0.4 through year 2002 and declines to 0.2 permanently. 
As shown in Figure VI, a sharp emission spike occurs one year before the expected decline in 
price volatility.    27
V.(iii)  Policy Implications 
 
It is generally concluded that uncertainty about the cost of controlling carbon dioxide 
emissions make price instruments preferable to quantity instruments because the cost of limiting 
one ton of emissions is expected to rise as the abatement increases, while the expected benefit of 
each ton of carbon reduced is roughly constant because climate change is driven by stock effects 
rather than flow effects.(Hoel and Karp, 2001; Pizer, 2002).
30   However, for a multi-period 
emission control, when marginal abatement costs are also uncertain for regulated sources, a 
tradable quota system that allows banking creates incentive for early abatement and generates 
substantial higher environmental benefits than a tax schedule. In addition, since the initial caps 
on carbon emissions are likely to be relatively undemanding, the expectation of later, more 
stringent caps will tend to produce even higher reduction in initial years even when the cap is 
non-binding.
31   
 
On the other hand, when the marginal benefits of abatement are steeper compared with the 
marginal costs, a quantity instrument without restrictions on the temporal transfer of emissions, 
may not necessarily be preferable to a price regulation. This is because a quota system exposes 
firms to volatile market prices, which encourages reallocation of emissions in response to 
observed uncertainty. When marginal damaging effects increase rapidly along with the increase 
of emission flows, a price instrument would be advisable to directly control the marginal social 
cost. Another potential solution is to employ a hybrid approach that combines a tradable quota 
system with some safety measures, such as restricting the intertemporal trading ratio and/or 
applying discounting to banked permits. The government may also consider incorporating 
multiple polluting industries into a national trading program so that uncertainties facing one 
industry can be diversified, and the importance of building up a bank to buffer unexpected price 
strike may be reduced.  
 
VI. Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this paper, I study the theory and empirical behavior of intertemporal emission trading 
under uncertainty, and its implications for policy instrument choice and banking regime design. 
The theoretical analysis suggests a positive relationship between industry-wide uncertainty and 
emission banking. In an intertemporal emission trading system, increased output or input price 
uncertainty induces larger emission reductions and higher allowance prices. Empirical analysis 
based on data from the U.S. SO2 allowance market provides consistent time-series evidence. The 
results suggest that increased price volatility induced by electricity market restructuring could 
have contributed to 8-11% of the extra emission reductions during Phase I of the trading program. 
Numerical simulations yield similar elasticity estimates.   
 
                                                 
30 The conclusion follows from Weitzman (1974) that when the slope of the marginal cost function is greater than 
the slope of the marginal abatement function, price instruments are preferable to quantity instruments because they 
are much more likely to minimize the adverse consequences of choosing the wrong level of control. 
31 Currently, the transfer of unused allowances from the period 2005 - 2007 to the first commitment period under the 
Kyoto Protocol, i.e. 2008–2012, is not allowed under an EU-wide ban on banking, which from an  environmental 
point of view, seems to be a troubling decision.   28
Uncertainty affects the pattern of emission levels and abatement costs over time. Its impact 
on both economic efficiency and environmental outcomes could be sizable. I estimate and 
compare the welfare effects under different output price volatility and provide relevant policy 
recommendations.  
 
The future work will be focused on extending the model to reflect other sources of 
uncertainty existing in the real world, such as uncertainties over emission cap and interest rate. 
For example, emission cap can be endogenously determined by the size of the global carbon 
market, i.e. the number of participating countries; Interest rate that reflects countries 
macroeconomic policy may also have important implications for the optimal emission decisions.   29
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THE MARGINAL VALUE OF ALLOWANCES IS CONVEX IN THE ELECTRICITY PRICE 
 
(A) Cobb-Douglas Production Function 
 
Rewrite the optimization problem for a representative firm in the industry: 
 
max[ ( , ) ( , )] e Pg l h cl h −  
s.t. 
2 (, ) ( ) lh lh B elh l h l h γ δδ μμ == + = +        ( A 0 )  
 
where 
1 (, ) glh G lh
α α − =  , c(l, h) = Pll+Phh;  B2 is the total available emission allowances in the 
terminal period.  
 
Define the Lagrangian expression:  
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The expression on the right of (A5) is the marginal rate of technical substation (MRTS) between 
the two types of fuel. Eq.(A5) says that at the optimum the MRTS between l and h must be equal 
to their price ratio (including the price paid for allowances).   
  
Define the following:  (1 )( ) and   ( ) ll l h h h dP d P α λμ αλ μ ≡− + ≡ +
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Solving (A6) and (A0), we obtain the conditional factor demand functions   34
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The inequality (A9) clearly holds for all values of Pe, dh and dl. 
 
Differentiating (A9) with respect to λ  defines the key derivative of the theorem as  
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Let / lh dd d = . Note that the minimum value of 
22 221
(1 ) ( ) hl d
d
αμ α μ +−  in the last bracketed term 







= .   
Since by construction, there is 







α λμ α μ




, then  
22 22 1
(1 ) ( ) hl x
x







, which proves the convexity of the 
marginal value of permits with respect to electricity price (recalling that λ  is the Lagrangian 
multiplier and represents the marginal valuation of a unit of permit). 
 
(B) CES Production Function 
 
Next consider a more general CES production function  
 
1
(( 1 ) ) gGl h
ρρ ρ αα =+ −         ( A 1 2 )  







 is the elasticity of substitution. α  still reflects distribution weight of 
low-carbon fuel. 
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Apparently, (A17) holds for all values of Pe, dh and dl. 
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Note that (A19) has a similar structure to that of the last bracketed term of (A10). Following the 

















. Therefore, given a more general form of production function, the marginal value of 
allowances is still convex in Pe.  
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Appendix B. 
 
PROOF. THE MARGINAL VALUE OF ALLOWANCES IS CONVEX IN INPUT COSTS l P  AND h P . 
 
Following previous discussion, substitute  (1 )( ) and   ( ) ll l h h h dP d P α λμ αλ μ ≡− + ≡ +
) )
 into 
Eq.(A7) to obtain λ  as an implicit function of Pe 
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The inequality follows naturally.  So λ  is also a convex function of l P . Similarly, we can show 
that λ  is convex in  h P . Therefore, increases in the mean preserving spread of Pl and Ph increases 
the expected marginal value of permits. 
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Appendix C. 
 
PROOF: In an imperfect electricity market, the marginal value of allowances is also convex 
in electricity prices. 
 
Consider the following optimization problem for a firm with market power in electricity market 
described presented in the paper (Eq.[20]) 
 
 
(1 ) max[ ] lh VW G l h P l P h
εε α ε α − =− −        ( A 1 6 )  
 






=≤ ,  W is the stochastic demand shifter and G is the productivity parameter. 
 




1( 1 ) 0 ll WG l h P
εε α ε α εα λμ
−− −− =         ( A 1 7 )  
 
(1 ) 1 (1 ) 0 hh WG l h P
εε α ε α εα λ μ
−− −− − =        ( A 1 8 )  
 
The MRT is unaffected by returns to scale and is again described by Eq.(A5). A similar exercise 
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Taking partial derivative of (A19) with respect to λ  
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Where   
 
22
3 (1 )( ) (1 )( (1 ) ) hl lh hl lh Td d P P αα μ μ ε α μ α μ =− + + − − −     (A21) 
 







The second order derivative of λ  with respect to W is 
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. Hence when electricity market is 
imperfect, the marginal value of permits is still convex in the underlying stochastic variable.  
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Appendix D Data Sources 
 
I obtained annual data on allowances initial allocations, holdings, transactions, and 
deductions (for emissions compliance purposes) from the EPA’s allowance tracking system 
spanning from 1995 to 2004 for all 263 Phase I affected coal-fired generating units. I merged this 
dataset with information collected from FERC Form 767. FERC Form 767 is an annual survey 
on steam-electric plant unit operating and design covering the period 1996-2004, from which I 
took annual observations at the generating unit level on unit nameplate capacity, the status of 
scrubber installation, electricity generations, load hours, fuel consumption and monthly fuel 
sulfur content and heat content, Using information about fuel consumption, fuel heat content, 
total generation, along with the emission data derived from the EPA’s allowance tracking system, 
I computed heat rate, heat input, and emission rate for each unit-year observation. Because data 
are missing for certain years, and because some units were not operating for an entire year, the 
number of observations varies from unit to unit.  
 
The price information on fuel, electricity, natural gas, and allowances are obtained from 
different sources. To construct data on prices and input shares for low- and high-sulfur coal, the 
above merged data set was then merged with the Form FERC-423 on monthly cost and quality of 
coals for electric plants from 1995 to 2004. Form FERC-423 records the physical quantity, Btu 
content, delivered cost, and carbon content of each fuel transaction at each electric plant. A SO2 
emission boundary of 2.5 pounds per million Btu was used to distinguish low- and high-sulfur 
coal. This value was chosen so that the burning of low-carbon coal meets Phase I standards on 
average. Fuel prices are calculated by dividing the delivered cost by the heat content of the fuel.  
Fuel prices are missing for some plants when only one type of fuel is purchased (the price of the 
other fuel is unobservable). To obtain the cost of fuel that is not purchased by the plant, I use its 
price in the previous year as an approximation.  
 
The electricity price data are drawn from the responses from electric utilities survey Form 
EIA-861 “Annual Electric Power Industry Report.”  From this data set, I obtained the annual 
average industrial price for all years from 1995 to 2004 at the state level. Industrial prices are the 
most volatile and least protected by PUC regulation. The volatility of industrial prices is mainly 
driven by changes in fuel costs. However, because of the existence of long-term contacts, to use 
industrial prices may underestimate the actual price volatility in the spot market. Natural gas 
wellhead prices were collected from EIA historical databases. SO2 regulation costs are calculated 
as the mean of two monthly price indices of SO2 allowances prices that brokerage firms Cantor 
Fitzgerald and Fieldston report to the EPA.  
 
Distance to fuel mines was provided by the EPA’s Acid Rain Division. Data on regulatory 
status were collected from the Retail Wheeling & Restructuring Report, a state-by-state reporting 
of regulatory commissions, state legislation, and utilities activities related to retail competition 
published quarterly by the Edison Electric Institute. These data are crosschecked with the LEAP 
Letter published bimonthly by William A. Spratley & Associates, National Regulatory Research 
Institute Web site and EIA’s publication on Status of State Electric Industry Restructuring 
Activity.   
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Appendix E Stochastic Dynamic Simulation Model Description 
 
Here I present the computational details of the numerical simulation, programming language, 
hardware and software used.  Consider the following optimization problem 
 
1
(1 ) (1 ) 1
,,
(,) { ( ,) ( ,) [ ( , ) ] max
tt t
te tt e t t tt t tt t t e t t
lhB
VPB P glh clh EV P B β
+
++ + ≡− +      (A24) 
s.t.       1 lt h t t t t lh A B B μ μ + += + −  
           1 0 tt t B AB + ≤≤ +  
 
where 
(1 ) () tt t gG l h
α αε − = .  
 
This is a multivariate optimization problem with three control variables (l, h, and B). To simplify 
the problem, I derive the structural relationship between l,  h and B based on first-order 
conditions. This derivation, which involves some tedious calculation,
32  leads to the following 
specifications: 
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(2) lt and ht are determined by the following two static optimality equations 
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      (A26) 
 
Noting that now the problem is simplified as we only need to search for the solution for B, and 
find optimal choices for l and h using Eqs. (A25) and (A26). Applying a grid search to obtain the 
initial guess for B (B* < 20) I then specify a grid of 2001 points between 1 and 20 (million tons) 
to compute the value function (A24) at each time t and each state of P et, beginning with the 
terminal value function and working back to period 1 to compute the equilibrium time path for B 
and λ , which jointly determine the optimal choices for lt and ht. 
 
The program needed for the computation of the model was coded in C++ and complied to run on 
Windows- based machines. The whole simulation runs in one minute. All the code is available 






                                                 
32 Available from the author, upon request.   41
Figure I 
 ANNUAL EMISSION CAP, AGGREGATED EMISSIONS AND BANKED ALLOWANCES 
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FIGURE II 

















































NOTE: The vertical axis describes the total amount of banked permits of the polluting industry in 
each year (million tons). θ  is the mean-preserving spread of the stochastic electricity price. The 
dashed line corresponds to a scenario that θ =0.2 and the emission cap remains constant at 7 
million tons across all years. The shaded, fuzzy line tracks actual allowance stock in the SO2 
allowance market. All the other lines correspond to a two-stage schedule of declining emission 
standards with total emissions capped at 7 million tons from 1995 to 1997 and at 3.5 million tons 
after year 2000.  
0.2 θ =
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FIGURE III 
























































NOTE: The vertical axis describes the aggregate annual emissions of the industry (million tons). 
θ  is the mean-preserving spread of the stochastic electricity price. The dashed line corresponds 
to a scenario in which θ =0.2 and the emission cap remains constant at 7 million tons across all 
years. All the other lines correspond to a two-stage schedule of declining emission standards 
with total emissions capped at 7 million tons from 1995 to 1997 and at 3.5 million tons after year 
2000.  
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FIGURE IV 
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NOTE: The vertical axis describes the cumulative emissions in each year (million tons). θ  is the 
mean-preserving spread of stochastic electricity price. The dashed line corresponds to a scenario 
in which θ =0.2 and the emission cap remains constant at 7 million tons across all years. All the 
other lines correspond to a two-stage schedule of declining emission standards with total 
emissions capped at 7 million tons from 1995 to 1997 and at 3.5 million tons after year 2000.    45
FIGURE V 

























































NOTE: The vertical axis describes the real term emission price (х100 $/ton). θ  is the mean-
preserving spread of stochastic electricity price. The dashed line corresponds to a scenario in 
which θ =0.2 and the emission cap remains constant at 7 million tons across all years. The 
shaded, fuzzy line tracks actual allowance stock in the SO2 allowance market. All the other lines 
correspond to a two-stage schedule of declining emission standards with total emissions capped 
at 7 million tons from 1995 to 1997 and at 3.5 million tons after year 2000.    46
FIGURE VI 




















































NOTE: The graphs describes emission path under a scenario in which the price spread θ = 0.2 
from 1995 to 2002 and drops to θ = 0.4 through 2020.  
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Table I.  DEFINITION OF THE SYMBOLS 
 
l  low-carbon fuel input level 
h  high-carbon fuel input level 
g  electricity output level 
x  permits bought (x > 0) or sold (x < 0) 
Pe  electricity price 
Pa  permit price 
Pl  low-carbon fuel price 
Ph  high-carbon fuel price 
A  permits issued by the government (annual) 
B  banked emission permits 
e  emission level 
δ   carbon content of the fuel 
γ   converting rate of carbon to carbon dioxide 
μ   carbon dioxide content of the fuel 
V  value of the firm 
β   discount ratio 
r  discount rate 
σ   ratio of marginal products of high- and low-carbon fuel 
λ   shadow value of permits 
ϖ   convenience yield of banked permits( 0) ϖ ≥  
G  productivity factor of electric industry 
α   the share of low-carbon fuel (0 <α <1) 
θ   mean-preserving spread of stochastic electricity prices 
ρ   low- and high-carbon fuel’s elasticity of substitution parameter 
ϕ   mark-up coefficient of a unit with market power in a electricity market 
(1 ϕ ≥ ) 
W  exogenous stochastic demand shifter in the electricity market 
ε   return-to-scale parameter of production technology  1 ε ≤  
s  allowed return on capital cost under ROR regulation 
k  previously invested capital of an electric firm 
π   a regulated firm’s gross revenue net of operating expenses 
φ  
Lagrangian multiplier associated with ROR profit constraint. It 
reflects the extra profit a firm would get if the profit restriction is 
relaxed marginally. 0 1 φ < <  implies profit constraint is effective. 
τ   extra return on permits expenditures for a regulated utility 
D  Pollution damage function  
n  Convexity of the social damage function 




Variables Obs. Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max
Emissionrate(tons/MWh)  1595 .011  .007  .00008 .041 
e P Δ  (%)  1595 .050  .037  .014 .170 
Pa(dollars/ton)  1595 133  55  80 285 
Pe (cents/KWh)  1595 4.21  .95  2.68 9.54 
Pl (cents/mmBTU)  1595 127.8  28.0  71.3  279 
Ph (cents/mmBTU)  1595 126.7  43.2  76.7 418.6 
Png(dollars/thousand cubic feet)  1595 2.97  1.34  1.77 5.45 
Vintage  1595 1964  7.8  1949 1978 
AGE (years)  1595 36  8.1  18 55 
HEATERATE(mmBTU/MWh)  1595 10.23  1.05  2.50 17.90 
WORKLOAD (hours)  1595 7253.5  1077.8  792  8760 
Initial (tons)  1595 17467  17877  144  192637 
Carry (tons)  1595 11187  18472  0  155236 
Stock (tons)  1595 29653  27153  343  277612 
MUNI  1595 .021  .144  0  1 
CAP (MW)  1595 356  254  75  1300 
l δ (lbs/mmBTU))  1452 1.64  .68  0.41 2.98 
h δ  (lbs/mmBTU))  1452 4.41  1.28  3.00 8.95 
DPRB (miles)  1461 1063  327  87 1773 
RTE93(lbs/mmBTU)  864 2.32  1.79  .01 8.06 
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TABLE III 
YEARLY OBSERVATIONS ON REGULATORY STATUSES, SCRUBBER INSTALLATION AND FUEL 
SWITCHING/BLENDING 
 
Year Retail  Access  Transit  Scrubber  Switch  No-blend 
1996 28  165  23  34  21 
1997 44  141  23  38  15 
1998 58  127  23  35  23 
1999  105  83 21 54  8 
2000  87 85 21 56 15 
2001  55 85 17 40  3 
2002  55 84 19 65 11 
2003  49 85 16 50 13 
2004  49 86 17 36  7 
 
Note: This table shows annual observations on the number of units affected by retail 
restructuring, installed scrubbers, switch to low-sulfur coal, or with no fuel blending. After 
1998, because many generating units were divestitured to non-utilities and are no longer 
reporting fuel purchasing costs to the public, the sample size shrinks, which is reflected by 
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TABLE IV   
DETERMINANTS OF EMISSION RATE (IN LOG FORM) 
 
Variables   (1)   (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
-.878** -.858** -.865** -.937** -.896** -.901** 
e P Δ  
(.401) (.335) (.307) (.365) (.409) (.407) 
lnPa -.031  -.051  -1.807***  -.024  -.196**  _ 
  (.065) (.060) (.478) (.038) (.079)   
lnPe  -.269 -.249 -.221  -.234**  -153 -.305 
  (.224) (.177) (.163) (.118) (.252) (.222) 
lnPl  .047  .139* .008 .046 .016  -.003 
  (.086) (.076) (.075) (.100) (.094) (.106) 
lnPh  .103 .041  .118**  .103* .133 .037 
  (.089) (.058) (.056) (.051) (.091) (.085) 
RetailAccess  -.047 -.059 -.048  .092  .009 -.030 
  (.051) (.039) (.035) (.046) (.064) (.050) 
Transit  .069 .073 .073  -.054 .083  -.005 
  (.042) (.085) (.079) (.050) (.096) (.061) 
SCRUBBER  -2.447*** -2.158*** -2.313***  -.396** -2.442*** -2.138*** 
  (.036) (.081) (.138) (.068) (.038) (.031) 
AGE  -.023 -.006 -.023  .008 -.003  .012 
  (.026) (.017) (.019) (.019) (.026) (.035) 
AGE2  -.00009 -.0002 -.0001 -.0003  -.00009 -.0004 
  (.0003) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.0003) (.0005) 
lnHEATRATE  .163* .271**  .133  -.247 .234** .231** 
  (.098) (.114) (.110) (.205) (.094) (.089) 
WORKLOAD  -.053 -.085 -.059 -.092 -.013 -.139 
  (.088) (.075) (.070) (.068) (.092) (.095) 
INITIAL  1.20e-06 1.31e-06 1.18e-06  -3.62e-07 8.85e-07 1.20e-06 
  (9.33e-07) (9.55e-07) (8.83e-07) (4.04e-07) (9.74e-07) (1.90e-06) 
MUNI e P Δ   .245** .113  .245**  .135**  .236** .104 
  (.095) (.107) (.112) (.042) (.099) (.077) 
CAP  _  -1.691 _ _ _ _ 
    (1.846)     
CAP2  _  .061 _ _ _ _ 
    (.173)     
Constant -7.258***  264.390***  _  -17.074  -11.209***  -4.959*** 
 (.660)  (97.189)    (4.224)  (.858)  (1.013) 
R
2  .930 .717 .929 .961 .859 .944 
Observations  1586 1586 1552 1032 1291  871 
 
NOTE: Dependent Variable is Ln(emissionrate). Columns (1) and (2) report results from estimating Eq.(31) 
via the fixed effects and random effects models. A Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that there is 
no systematic difference between fixed and random effects estimations. The test statistics are 
2(19) χ =61.84,  P-value=.0000. Column (3) reports IV/2SLS estimation using natural gas wellhead price 
as an instrument for SO2 allowance price. F statistic for the first stage regression is 22.08. Column (4) 
reports fixed effects estimation for Eq.(33). The sample is composed of 118 units that were operating in 
1993. Column (5) reports estimation results based on a balanced panel dataset, which restricts the sample 
to 145 units that were active from 1996 to 2004.  Column (6) reports estimation based on sample data 
from 1998 to 2003. Standard errors clustered by unit are reported in parentheses. *** indicates significant 
at the 1% level; ** indicates significant at the 5% level; * indicates significant at the 10% level. Reported 
R
2 is the adjusted R
2 for fixed effects and random effects models and the centered R
2 for the IV/2SLS 
model.  
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TABLE V   
DETERMINANTS OF ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN ALLOWANCE STOCK 
 
Variables  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) 
2.410** 2.457** 2.358** 2.759**  1.615  ** 
e P Δ  
(1.059) (1.108) (1.088) (1.408)  (.509) 
lnPa -.171  -.216*  -.294**  -.327*** 
 (.113)  (.118)  (.133) 
_ 
(.093) 
lnPe  .135 .369 .249 .389  -.169 
  (.416) (.586) (.385) (.671) (.287) 
lnPl  -.235 -.110 -.327 -.073  .-.013 
  (.361) (.206) (.343) (.279) (.093) 
lnPh  -.021 -.021 -.020  .007 -.117 
  (.114) (.151) (.109) (.199) (.097) 
RetailAccess  .085 .101 .140 .119  -.012 
  (.120) (.126) (.122) (.358) (.229) 
Transit  -.078 -.077 -.143  -..051 -.117 
  (.108) (.286) (.154) (.104) (.231) 
SCRUBBER  -.520***  .043 -.338**  -.666*** -.491** 
  (.052) (.126) (.126) (.045) (.050) 
AGE  .028 .035 .041  .111* .023 
  (.035) (.041) (.034) (.051) (.033) 
AGE2 -.0006  -.0006  -.0005  -.002**  .00002 
  (.0005) (.0005) (.0004) (.0008) (.0004) 
lnHEATRATE -.463 -.064 -.498  -.548** -.241 
  (.300) (.301) (.266) (.216) (.229) 
WORKLOAD  .541** .240 .518 .105  .579*** 
  (.183) (.227) (.467) (.910) (.137) 
INITIAL  2.60e-06 2.20e-06 2.31e-06 3.16e-06  -1.41e-07 
  (2.30e-06) (2.94e-06) (2.41e-06) (4.09e-06) (1.32e-06) 
MUNI e P Δ   -.043 .054  -.041  -.102  -.057 
  (.049) (.220) (.173) (.071) (.045) 
CAP  -1.767 _ _ _ 
 
_ 
(2.304)    
CAP2  .175 _ _ _ 
 
_ 
(.215)    
Constant 1.100  10.89  -5.280  4.089** 




2  .226 .046 .228 .301 .201 
Observations 1586  1586  1552  1032  1291 
 
NOTE: The dependent variable is  [1 ] () / i t it it BB B + −  (%). Columns (1) and (2) report estimation results from 
the fixed effects and random effects models. A Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis; the error 
term  i α is correlated with the other explanatory variables. The test statistics are 
2(19) χ  =17.72,  P-
value=.5412. Column (3) reports IV/2SLS estimation using natural gas wellhead price as an instrument 
for SO2 allowance price. Column (4) reports reduced sample estimation between (data from 1998 to 2003). 
Column (5) reports estimation results based on a balanced panel dataset, which restricts the sample to 145 
units that were active from 1996 to 2004.  Standard errors clustered by unit are reported in parentheses. 
*** indicates significant at the 1% level; ** indicates significant at the 5% level; * indicates significant at 
the 10% level. Reported R
2 is the adjusted R
2 for the fixed effects and random effects models and the 
centered R
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TABLE VI  
ESTIMATES FOR EMISSION RATE AND PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN BANKING OF ALLOWANCES CONTROLLING 
FOR UNITS’ DISTANCES TO PRB COAL 
 
  Emission Rate  Percentage Change in Allowance Stock 
Variables   (1)   (2)  (3)  (4) 
-.838** -.832**  2.590**  2.642** 
e P Δ  
(.342) (.348)  (1.196)  (1.924) 
lnPa -.043  .002  -.234  -.836 
 (.056)  (.003)  (.122)  (2.917) 
lnPe -.498**  -.449**  .361  .559 
 (.183)  (189)  (.641)  (.669) 
DPRB .003**  .003**  -.002  -.002 
 (.001)  (.001)  (.002)  (.002) 
DPRB2 -4.02e-06**  -4.17e-09**  1.63e-06  1.51e-06 
 (1.50e-06)  (4.95e-10)  (2.04e-06)  (1.72e-06) 
DPRB3 1.32e-09**  1.40e-09  -4.88e-10  -4.54e-10 
 (4.97e-10)  (4.95e-10)  (6.82e-10)  (5.75e-10) 
LSPremium .170**  .168**  .057  .058 
 (.060)  (.061)  (.070)  (.063) 
RetailAccess -.017  350.6**  .012  -.084 
 (.041)  (113.0)  (.317)  (.335) 
Transit .078  .085  -.064  -.122 
 (.085)  (.087)  (.299)  (.313) 
SCRUBBER -1.87**  -1.87**  .097 .101 
 (.103)  (.102)  (.143)  (.120) 
AGE -.010  -.012  .051  .042 
 (.016)  (.017)  (.044)  (.041) 
AGE2 -.0002  -.0002  -.0008  -.0007 
 (.0002)  (.0002)  (.0006)  (.0005) 
lnHEATRATE .349**  .344**  -.111 -.078 
 (.115)  (.116)  (.318)  (.299) 
WORKLOAD -.099  -.092  .235  .150 
 (.077)  (.078)  (.245)  (.243) 
INITIAL 1.21e-06  1.23e-06  2.08e-06  1.63e-06 
 (9.76e-07)  (9.88e-07)  (3.23e-06)  (3.20e-06) 
MUNI e P Δ   .142 .141  .053 .070 
 (.104)  (.104)  (.225)  (.196) 
CAP -1.988  -1.643  -2.039  -1.770 
 (1.820)  (1.840)  (2.544)  (2.163) 
CAP2 .192  .164  .214  .186 
 (.173)  (.175)  (.241)  (.204) 
constant 242.249**  135.358*  -7.913 
 (97.222)  (71.532)  (136.9) 
_ 
R
2 .710  .708  .049  .050 
Observations 1448  1425  1448  1425 
 
NOTE: Columns (1) and (2) report results from estimating determinants of the log of the annual average 
emission rates identified in Eq.(30) via fixed effects and IV/2SLS (using natural gas wellhead prices as an 
instrument for SO2 allowance price). Columns (3) and (4) report similar regressions with the dependent 
variable being the percentage change of annual allowance banking from random effects and the IV/2SLS 
model. All estimations use units’ distance to PRB coal as a proxy for low-sulfur coal price and include the 
low-sulfur coal premium as a repressor. Standard errors clustered by unit are reported in parentheses. *** 
indicates significant at the 1% level; ** indicates significant at the 5% level; * indicates significant at the 
10% level. Reported R
2 is the adjusted R
2 for the fixed effects and random effects models and the centered 
R
2 for the IV/2SLS model.   53
Table VII 
Banking Sensitivity Analysis for Values of Production Function Parameters and Input Costs  
 
  0.2 θ =   G=65  0.5 α =   Pl=130  Ph=110 
  * q =0.2  q =0.4  0.2 θ =   0.4 θ = 0.2 θ = 0.4 θ = 0.2 θ = 0.4 θ =   0.2 θ =   0.4 θ =
1995  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1996  1.14 1.19 0.07 0.98 1.04 1.87 1.75 2.34 1.66 2.27 
1997  2.44 2.57 0.31  1.9 2.25 3.67  3.6  4.7 3.44 4.59 
1998  3.93 4.15 0.84 2.88 3.67 5.62 5.56 7.14 5.33 6.99 
1999  5.62  5.9 1.91 4.28  5.3 7.71 7.62 9.65 7.33 9.46 
2000  7.5 7.85 3.53 6.04 7.16 9.94 9.78  12.23 9.46  11.99 
2001  6.1 6.47 2.13 4.64 5.73  8.8 8.55  11.36 8.19 11.1 
2002  4.88  5.28 1.2  3.54 4.5  7.78  7.41  10.56  7.04  10.29 
2003  3.84 4.26  0.6 2.72 3.47 6.89 6.37 9.82 5.99 9.52 
2004  2.98  3.4 0.22 2.13 2.63 6.11 5.45 9.13 5.05  8.8 
2005  2.26 2.68 0.01 1.72 1.95 5.44 4.63  8.5 4.24 8.14 
2006  1.7 2.11  0 1.44 1.43 4.86 3.89  7.9 3.52 7.54 
2007  1.28 1.65  0 1.23 1.07 4.36 3.26 7.35  2.9 6.99 
2008  0.99  1.3  0 1.09 0.82 3.93 2.72 6.84  2.4 6.49 
2009  0.78 1.06  0 0.99 0.64 3.56 2.26 6.38 1.97 6.03 
2010  0.65 0.89  0 0.91 0.52 3.24 1.89 5.93 1.61 5.61 
2011  0.56 0.77  0 0.86 0.44 2.96 1.57 5.52 1.34 5.21 
2012  0.5 0.69  0 0.83 0.38 2.72 1.31 5.13 1.12 4.85 
2013  0.44 0.63  0  0.8 0.34 2.52 1.12 4.76 0.98 4.49 
2014  0.41 0.58  0 0.77 0.31 2.34 0.97 4.39 0.87 4.13 
2015  0.38 0.55  0 0.74 0.28 2.17 0.85 3.99 0.77 3.74 
2016  0.35 0.52  0 0.69 0.25  2 0.75 3.54 0.68 3.32 
2017  0.29 0.46  0 0.61 0.21 1.79 0.65 3.05 0.59 2.86 
2018  0.23  0.4  0 0.47 0.15 1.51 0.53 2.51 0.48 2.36 
2019  0.11 0.27  0 0.26 0.07 1.08 0.36 1.82 0.33  1.7 
2020  0  0.03 0 0 0  0.43  0.1  0.85  0.09  0.78 
 
NOTE: The table shows simulation results for total amount of banked allowances (million tons) 
under different parameter values. * corresponds to the base case in which 0.2 θ = , q = 0.2, G = 55,   
 
 
 
 
 